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ABSTRACT 
 
 
A REVIEW OF THE FISCAL STIMULUS PLAN 
TAKEN BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT IN 2008 
 
By 
 
GAO Feng 
 
 
The 4-trillion RMB fiscal stimulus plan carried out by the Chinese government in late 2008 is 
illustrated in this paper as regard to its background, sources and uses. A comparison between 
the 2008 stimulus and the previous stimulus initiated in 1998 by the Chinese government is 
drawn. Then the stimulus package was analytically approached by using IS-LM model. A 
simple regression method is also applied to check how much expectation links to growth. 
Some relevant data seem to indicate the preliminary effects of the 2008 stimulus package. 
The practices of Chinese government’s stimulus plan could shed light on some important 
aspects of economic policy.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the year 2007, the US subprime mortgage crisis began to spread from financial sector to 
real economy, from US to the rest of the world. With Lehman Brothers’ collapse in 
September, 2008, the financial crisis reached a new high. Most of the macro-economic 
indicators continued to worsen. By then people’s confidence in world economy’s future was 
crashed heavily.  
 
Before this sudden global plunge, China’s economy was in good shape. Various indicators 
showed that the Chinese economy was experiencing expansion rather than recession, inflation 
rather than deflation in the first half of 2008. 
 
However, the outside shock soon took its toll on China’s economy. It was more and more 
evident that in a globalized economy, no country could thrive or survive alone. The impact of 
the made-in-America financial crisis was heavy and quick on China. In the years running up 
to the financial crisis, China’s economy growth had become more relied on foreign trades. 
Export had been taking a bigger share in China’s GDP since China joined WTO in 2001. In 
2008, its foreign trade dependency was as high as about 60 % (Li Ping, 2010). 
 
In late 2008, the shock on foreign trade was transmitted to other sectors of China’s economy. 
Together with the previous tightening macroeconomic policies taken by the Chinese 
government, the outside shock hit China’s economy as a second beat.  
 
Faced with both external turmoil and internal difficulties, the Chinese government reacted 
quickly. In November 2008, Chinese government announced a massive stimulus plan of 4 
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trillion RMB ($ 586 billion at the then exchange rate) to boost aggregate demand, and more 
importantly, to revive people’s confidence. 
 
This paper is to examine the contents and effects of the massive stimulus policy of the 
Chinese government in encountering the 2008 global economic crisis. It will dig into the 
details of the robust fiscal policy and find out sources of this huge stimulus (i.e., where the 
government raises the fund) and the use of this huge fund (i.e., where the government spends 
the money), and most importantly, how it works. 
 
Ten years before, in 1998, the Chinese government implemented a similar fiscal stimulus 
plan when suffering from the impacts of the Asian Financial Crisis. This paper also compares 
the current stimulus plan with the previous one, contrast the similarities and differences, and 
analyze the stimulus plans with IS-LM model and regression method.  
 
So far, the 2008 stimulus policy has passed its official time frame of two years. With dusts 
and mists settling down, relevant data are becoming more and more available. I use these 
dada to examine and analyze the short-term boosting effect of this biggest-ever fiscal 
stimulus in China. By drawing a preliminary picture of the stimulus policy’s effects, this 
paper also tries to evaluate the stimulus operation and shed light on some important aspects 
of economic policy. 
 
Some major findings are that 1) the Chinese government appears having realized the 
usefulness of Keynesian economics and applied it in real economic regulations, especially 
when in recession, 2) for the current period in China fiscal stimulus might be more effective 
than monetary stimulus in terms of boosting demand, 3) the two fiscal stimulus plans since 
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China’s transition from a “planned economy” to a “market economy” both seemed to be 
effective in promoting aggregate demand and economic growth, at least in short term, 4)and 
people’s confidence seems to forerun economic growth, thereby when applying fiscal 
stimulus the Chinese government appears to have also used some tricks to boost people’s 
confidence. 
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II. THE BIGGEST EVER STIMULUS PLAN IN CHINA’S HISTORY: TRIGGER, 
SOURCES AND USES 
 
1. Why is it?---a Keynesianism believer encounters an unprecedented global economic crisis 
 
Because of a history of 4-dacade planned economy (from the foundation of the new China in 
1949 to 1980s), China’s economy has a strong gene of government intervention. When 
China’s policy makers aim to transit China into a market economy, the pro-intervention 
Keynesianism has a natural appeal.  
 
Furthermore, as the most populous country in the world, China needs a growth rate of at least 
8%- 9% annually to absorb the 9-12 million Chinese that join the labor force each year 
(Wang Jingdong, 2009). Employment and social stability are the top concerns for the Chinese 
policy makers who are running such a big country. 
 
With the issue of employment at its center, Keynesianism’s logic originates from the theory 
of “effective demand”. Its basic point is that social employment depends on effective demand, 
and government can boost the demand when a recession is caused by short of it. 
 
Before the 2008 global financial crisis, due to the tightening macroeconomic polices since 
2004 which aimed to curb the overheated economy, China’s domestic growth had been 
witnessing a slow-down since late 2007. From 2007 to the first half of 2008, the central bank 
of China raised the reserve rate 15 times to a record high of 17.5%, and raised interest rate 6 
times in a row.  
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Besides the internal cooling down, the external economic situation for China was suddenly 
getting worse in late 2008. The global financial crisis was eroding real economy with 
devastating force. Therefore, the shock on the real economy of America and other developed 
countries led to less demand for China’s export and less Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to 
China, as shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2. 
 
Figure 1: Growth Rate of China’s Export, %   Figure 2: Growth Rate of FDI in China, % 
       (Jul. ---Dec. 2008)                             (Jan. ---Nov. 2008) 
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Source: National Bureau of Statistics, China 
 
The two adverse factors, internal and external, overlapped and dragged the aggregate demand 
dramatically down. In the third quarter of 2008, Chinese economic growth decelerated to 9%, 
compared to the 13% annual growth rate in 2007 and 11.6% in 2006. China’s stock prices 
plunged even more than that on Wall Street that same year (Figure 3). The property markets 
in major cities went into deep freeze, too (Figure 4). In November 2008, the World Bank 
revised its forecast for China’s 2009 growth to 7.5 percent, down from an estimated 9.2 
percent in June 2008.  
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Figure 3: Stock Market Performance              Figure 4: Property Market Performance 
Composite Index of Shanghai
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Source: National Bureau of Statistics, China 
 
Entering the second half of 2008, the Chinese central bank sensed the seriousness of the 
downward pressure and began to loosen monetary policy. The interest rate was lowered 
successively 4 times for a total of about 2 percentage points, but major economic indicators 
like quarterly GDP growth rate did not seem to turn better, as illustrated in Figure 5 and 
Figure 6.  
 
Figure 5: Weighted Average of Interbank Rate, %    Figure 6: Real Economic Growth, % 
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Source: National Bureau of Statistics, China 
 
Then it was deemed that monetary policy alone would not be effective or would not be 
effective quickly. Moreover, the lack of confidence might absorb much of the liquidity 
injection. In this situation, fiscal stimulus seemed to be a must for combating the 
demand-dragged economic downturn.  
 
2. Where is it from?---money matters but confidence matters too 
 
The 4-trillion-yuan stimulus represents about 15% of China’s GDP in 2007, one-third of the 
fixed-asset investment of 2007 and two-thirds of the Chinese government’s budget in 2008. 
The huge size of the pump-priming reflects the government’s determination to boost its 
economy.  
 
However, this huge number was not all about money. It turned out to be a soft number. As 
long as several months after the stimulus’ announcement, how to fund this big stimulus was 
still not clear from official information. At long last, in March 2009 (four months after the 
stimulus announcement), the central government disclosed that it would only initiate 1.18 
trillion RMB ($ 173 billion at then exchange rate) outlay, in a cross-three-year spectrum: 104 
billion Yuan for 2008, 487.5 billion Yuan for 2009 and 588.5 billion Yuan for 2010. The rest 
of the money comes from an estimation of following investments by the local governments, 
commercial banks and other social resources. And the total amount of investments within two 
to three years is expected to be 4 trillion RMB. It seems like a joke, but it is exactly how the 
Chinese government conjured up the astronomical stimulus number. 
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Table 1: Sources of the 4-trillion Stimulus 
 Sources 
Amount 
 (Bil RMB)  
Proportion 
(%) 
Initial central 
government 
expenditure 
long-term debt 
1180 29.5 
budget-stabilization fund 
budget surplus from 
previous year 
Expenditures 
to be 
triggered by 
the central 
government’s 
initiative  
local government 
expenditures 
2820 70.5 
policy-guided loans 
company bonds 
medium-term notes 
commercial bank loans 
social/private investments 
Source: National Development and Reform Commission, China 
 
This “bluffing” strategy adopted by the government deserves scrutiny. The big head line of 
4-trillion Yuan turned out to be both a fiscal and psychological stimulus. This shows the art of 
public policy in encountering an unprecedented crisis and panic: the government just makes a 
big promise and let the public know it is ready to do whatever is necessary, so there is no 
need to panic. In Section IV I will give more analysis in this regard. 
 
3. Where it goes to? --- a multi-aspect stimulus plan goes beyond government expenditure 
 
The stimulus plan outlined 10 general aspects: 1) accelerating the construction of public 
housing, 2) building more rural infrastructures such as large-scale irrigation and power grids, 
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3) expanding railways, highways and airports, 4)improving grassroots’ health services and 
education services, 5)fighting environmental degradation and promoting energy-efficiency, 6) 
upgrading the economic structure and supporting research and development in technical 
innovation; 7) accelerating the rebuilding of earthquake-ravaged area in May 2008. 8) It also 
promises income-increase for urban and rural residents, tax relief, and higher direct subsidies 
to farmers and tax rebate for export-oriented industries. 9) Funds will also be used to 
encourage financial institutions to lend to infrastructure projects, small businesses, and 
potential home and car buyers. 10) In addition, a comprehensive reform of the corporate 
value-added-tax (VAT) system would be pushed forward. New VAT rules would allow 
companies to reduce expenditures on new machinery and other capital equipment.  
 
Table 2: Breakdown of the Uses of the 4-trillion Stimulus 
Investment Amount (billion RMB) Proportion (%) 
Urban area low-income housing 
and other social welfares 
400 10 
Rural area development 
(infrastructure and welfare) 
370 9.25 
Railway, highway, airport, canal 1500 37.5 
Education and health 150 3.75 
Ecology engineering and 
environment improvement 
210 5.25 
Innovation, upgrading and 
restructuring of industries, 
including tax-cuts and tax rebates 
for some industries 
370 9.25 
Earthquake-hit area rebuilding 1000 25 
Source: National Development and Reform Commission, China 
 
As analyzed before, the 4-trillion-stimulus is a soft number; therefore the package breakdown 
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for each item can not be hard either. Regardless of this, from Table 2, it is clear that the major 
field of investment is infrastructure. It is argued by some economists that if a country’s 
infrastructure is not complete, government investment in infrastructure could act as a “down 
payment” and attract other sources of investment to follow up, which may have a bottle-neck 
releasing effect in the long-run (Ahmed &. Miller, 2000; Lin, 2009). As a developing country, 
China’s infrastructure system is far from complete or sufficient. Public investment on 
infrastructure might have a bigger effect in driving aggregate demand. 
 
Besides, we can also see from the ten major aspects announced by the central government 
that the stimulus plan is not only about investment but also about consumption subsidies and 
export promotion via tax cuts. This demonstrates that the stimulus plan is a comprehensive 
approach that goes beyond government spending. 
 
The sources and uses of the stimulus show that the Chinese government tries to minimize the 
impact of the global economic recession and maintain a vigorous economic growth through 
an all-over boosting of the demand side. 
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III. COMPARISION WITH THE 1998 FISCAL STIMULUS 
 
1．The 1998 stimulus plan 
 
A. Background 
In early 1990s, after withstanding an international and domestic turmoil for socialism, the 
Chinese government realized the critical importance of freeing up its economy from the 
“planned model”. Due to inexperience, in the reform and freeing-up process China’s inflation 
reached a record high of 27.7% in 1994. Thereafter, the central government took various 
measures to curb inflation and cool down the economy. In 1997 China’s economy realized a 
so-called “soft landing”. The GDP growth rate fell from 13.5% in 1993 to 8.8% in 1997, 
about one percentage point drop each year. However, the momentum of slowing down did not 
hold when the year turned into 1998. In the first half of 1998, the GDP growth rate was 
further down to 7%. Moreover, the price index showed a trend of negative growth and a 
deflation seemed to be in the corner. Before 1990s, China’s economy was marked by an 
outstanding character of insufficient supply and most of its economic crises came from lack 
of supply. In 1998, China’s economy for the first time in history showed an excess of supply 
and insufficient demand. 
 
Externally, in July 1997 the Thailand government gave up fixed foreign exchange regime and 
pushed down the first domino block of Asian Financial Crisis. Within half year, many Asian 
countries’ currency depreciated dramatically, their stock markets plunged and the economic 
growth stalled or even went negative. The external crisis’ impact on China’s economy was 
quick and heavy. For example, in the first half of 1998, China’s export growth slowed down 
dramatically to 7.6% from 26.6% in the previous year and in May 1998 the export turned to a 
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negative growth which was a rare phenomenon in several years.  
 
Beside the economic activities per se, China encountered a once-in-a-century flood in the 
summer of 1998. With no doubt, the flood would also take a heavy toll on the economy. 
Many economists and politicians worried that the coming years would be very difficult for 
China’s economy. 
 
B. Main features 
The “pro-active” fiscal policy taken by the Chinese government since 1998 was indeed an 
expansionary fiscal policy, which entailed an expansion of government expenditure. That 
usually means a deficit for the government. From 1998 to 2003, the Chinese government’s 
fiscal book showed a consistent and growing deficit. The deficit-to-GDP ratio increased from 
0.74% in 1997 to 1.09% in 1998. And the following years witnessed a growing momentum: 
1.94% in 1999, 2.52% in 2000, 2.29% in 2001 and 2.62% in 2002, which was approaching a 
warning level of 3% recognized by the international society.  
 
In August 1998, the standing committee of the Chinese National People’s Congress approved 
the expansionary fiscal policy, which reversed the direction of economic policy adopted in 
the previous several years. Beside scheduled debt issues, the central government therein 
issued additional 100-billion-yuan (1.5% of GDP) long-term construction bonds, which 
would raise funds solely for infrastructure constructions. The 100-billion-yuan bonds were 
sold only to the “big four” state-owned commercial banks: Industry and Commerce Bank of 
China(50 billion), Agriculture Bank of China(20 billion), Bank of China(10 billion) and 
Construction Bank of China(20 billion), with a term of 10 years and annual interest of 5.5%. 
The government separated the 100-billion-yuan debts evenly into two packages, which were 
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absorbed by 1998 and 1999 budget respectively. Therefore, a 50-billion-yuan additional 
government spending was recorded in 1998 and the deficit that year was increased from 43 
billion sharply to 93 billion Yuan. The reason why the 100-billion-yuan bonds were issued 
solely to the big-four state-owned commercial banks was that the saving rate of residents and 
private sectors was high (about 40%) and the excess of deposits over loans in commercial 
banks was huge (1.02 trillion Yuan or 13% of GDP), and also importantly, as the banks were 
controlled by the government, selling bonds to them at a predetermined price with a 
predetermined amount would save time and reduce transaction cost.  
 
In the second quarter of 1999, faced with a situation that the fixed-asset investments were still 
weak, exports continued decreasing and consumption demands remained low, the central 
government decided to further expand the fiscal policy. In addition to an original 
50-billion-yuan long-term construction bond issue plan at the beginning of the year, the 
central government added another 60-billion-yuan long-term bond issue in the middle of the 
year. The money was going to infrastructure, technology upgrading and replacement in some 
key industries, R&D in heavy industries, environment preservation and education. 
 
In 2000, the economy showed some positive turnarounds in the first half of the year. The 
central government decided to continue the pro-active fiscal policy to consolidate the 
fundamentals of economy. In addition to a 100-billion-yuan long-term bond issue plan at the 
beginning of the year, the Ministry of Finance issued 50 billion Yuan long-term bonds during 
the year. The money was used to accelerate those projects previously initiated by the 
government. 
 
In 2001, the central government kept its expansionary policy and issued 150 billion Yuan 
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long-term bonds, in which 100 billion were for the in-process projects and 50 billion for the 
development of the backward Western Area of China. In the following years of 2002, 2003 
and 2004, the central government issued 150 billion, 140 billion and 110 billion Yuan 
long-term construction bonds respectively, just to finish the uncompleted projects. During the 
later years, the government’s large amount issue of debt could be seen as a 
“have-no-other-choice” decision. It was somewhat hijacked by the in-process projects. 
 
Table 3: Chinese Government Debts, 1995-2010 
Year 
Total Issue of 
Government 
Debts (Bil 
RMB) 
(1) 
Growth 
Rate of 
Debt Issue 
(%) 
(2) 
Balance of 
Government 
Debts (Bil 
RMB) 
(3) 
Balance of 
Government 
Debt to GDP 
ratio (%) 
(4) 
Issue of 
Long-term 
Construction 
Bonds (Bil 
RMB) 
(5) 
1995 154.98 -- 330.03 5.43 -- 
1996 196.80 26.99 436.14 6.13 -- 
1997 247.71 25.87 550.89 6.98 -- 
1998 322.88 30.35 786.23 9.47 100.00 
1999 370.21 14.66 1041.06 11.77 110.00 
2000 415.54 12.24 1301.00 13.28 150.00 
2001 448.35 7.90 1561.80 14.45 150.00 
2002 566.00 26.24 1933.74 16.24 150.00 
2003 602.92 6.52 1749.00 12.94 140.00 
2004 672.63 11.56 1919.96 12.01 110.00 
2005 704.20 4.69 2877.40 15.56 80.00 
2006 888.33 26.15 3556.80 16.44 60.00 
2007* 798.12 (10.16) 3786.55 14.25 50.00 
2008 855.82 7.23 3777.15 12.03 30.00 
2009 1628.07 90.23 4473.77 13.14 500.00 
2010 1777.82 9.20 5204.81 13.08 600.00 
*Note: In 2007, the Chinese government issued 1550 billion Yuan special debt to purchase 200 billion US 
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dollar from the central bank of China and established an investment company, and this debt was not 
included in the above data. 
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics, China; Ministry of Finance, China 
 
Figure 7: Government Debts Relative to GDP, % 
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Sources: National Bureau of Statistics, China; Ministry of Finance, China 
 
From 1998 to 2004, the average annual growth rate of GDP was about 10%. The debt issue 
grew during this fiscal expansion period at a 14% average annual rate, which was much faster 
than the GDP growth. Consequently, the pro-active fiscal policy left a relatively big debt 
burden for the government. At the beginning of 2003, the accumulated government debt 
balance had increased to 16% strong of GDP from 7% in 1997. 
 
C. Economic performance following the 1998 stimulus plan 
The economic indicators in the following years showed that China somewhat offset the shock 
of Asian Financial Crisis, improved the macro-economic environment, boosted aggregate 
demand, arrested deflation and pushed the economy back onto the track of its potential 
growth. It was estimated that the stimulus plan carried out from 1998 to 2003 drove the 
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economy up by 1.5 to 2 percentage points each year, which was essential to the annual 
growth rate of 7%-8% through the period（Jia Kang, 2008）. The economic performance 
following the stimulus plan, though not in a complete course-and-effect logic, demonstrated 
some effectiveness of the Keynesian approach.  
 
Table 4: Main Economic Indicators since the 1998 Stimulus Plan 
 (% change from previous year) 
Year 
GDP 
(1) 
Total Retail 
Sales of 
Consumer 
Goods 
(2)  
Total 
Investmen
t in Fixed 
Assets 
(3) 
Export 
(4) 
CPI 
(5) 
Contribution 
Rate of 
Government 
Debt to GDP 
Growth (%) 
(6) 
1998 7.3 6.80 13.89 0.50 -0.8 20.86 
1999 7.9 6.80 5.10 6.10 -1.4 27.46 
2000 8.6 9.70 10.26 27.86 0.4 14.44 
2001 8.1 10.10 13.05 6.78 0.7 16.09 
2002 9.5 11.80 16.89 22.36 -0.8 12.55 
2003 10.6 9.10 27.74 34.58 1.2 6.81 
2004 10.4 13.30 26.83 35.42 3.9 4.68 
2005 11.2 12.90 25.96 28.40 1.8 --- 
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics, China; Ministry of Finance, China; “China’s 
Pro-active Fiscal Policy: A Documentation of the Projects Invested by the Government Debts 
1998-2004” 
 
First, aggregate demand recovered. Investment contributed a lot to the economic growth. In 
2004, the contribution rate of investment to economic growth was 50%, up from 30% in 1997. 
Consumption gained a momentum of stable growth. The total retail sales of consumer goods 
rose from 3339 billion RMB in 1998 to 5950 billion RMB in 2004, with a growth rate rising 
from 6.8% to 13.3%. Consumption’s driving power for economic growth was enhanced. 
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Export regained an uprising momentum, increasing from $183.7 billion to $593.4 billion with 
a growth rate up to 35.4% from a trivial 0.5% in 1998. The GDP’s growth rate from 1999 to 
2004 years ran in a high corridor of 8-11%. Deflation was stalled. CPI turned from negative 
to positive. Other price index became robust too.  
 
Second, potential productivity in the long run was improved. Because of the expansion of 
government investment, the infrastructure got upgraded in a short time. Railways, highways, 
airports and canals got expanded or renewed. The high way in China was increased from 
4700 km in 1997 to 25100 km in 2002, railway extended by 5500 km, and 35 airports got 
built or renewed. A number of irrigation works and water conservancies were constructed. In 
rural areas, running water system, electricity grid and inter-county highway network were 
further developed. A number of industries got improved in terms of technology and structure.  
 
Third, social welfare further developed. Urban residents’ housing, transportation, drinking 
water and heating systems were improved. Education and health care were provided more 
efficiently and more equally. And the Western China Development project was initiated 
which would level the playing ground for the people in the backward areas. 
 
2. Comparisons of the two stimuli of 1998 and 2008 
 
A. Both of the stimulus plans were made to fight an internal slowdown as well as an outside 
shock, but fundamentals seemed better in 2008. 
For the 1998 stimulus, it was due to insufficient domestic and external demands. From 1993 
to early 1996, the Chinese authority tightened control on money supply. In 1997, the 
economy realized a “soft landing”, but since then the problem of weak demand became more 
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and more obvious. Besides, the imbalance of China’s economic structure caused by long-time 
duplicate construction became more serious. Under the pressure of weak domestic demand 
the Chinese economy was faced with a sharp drop in growth rate. Externally, in July 1997, as 
the Thailand government announced giving up fixed foreign exchange regime, a financial 
landslide erupted and spread to many other Asian countries. The Asian Financial Crisis 
quickly transformed to an economic recession. Russia, Latin America and the United States, 
which acted as China’s main trade and investment partners beside Asian countries, were 
affected one after another. Therefore, crisis and recession in these countries crashed China’s 
foreign trade volume and investment inflow. Export volume decreased a lot. In 1998, the 
China’s export-GDP ratio was about 20%. In the first quarter of 1998, the export growth was 
13.2%, in April it was 7.8%, -1.8% in May, 1.6% in June, 3.5% in July, and -2.9% in August, 
far below previous year’s 20% average growth rate. Foreign investment shrank hugely. 
Because of the Asian Financial Crisis, many counties suffered from deflation. Thus, 
companies in those countries could not raise enough funds and their investment in China 
consequently decreased. Much of the international capital flew back to America and Europe. 
This resulted in a great reduction of foreign investment in China. Through 1998, most of the 
months witnessed foreign direct investment (FDI) decreasing. 
 
In the run-up to the 2008 stimulus plan, from 2005 to 2007, the Chinese economy was 
growing in a corridor of tame inflation. During that period, the Chinese government adopted 
a moderate and then tightened economic policy. In 2008, those tight policies began taking 
effects and unfortunately coincided with an international financial turmoil, just like the 
situation 10 years before. Since the third quarter of 2008, the downside pressure on China’s 
economy became really serious. In September 2008, as Lehman Brothers collapsed and the 
American government took charge of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the subprime mortgage 
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crisis in the U.S. upgraded to an overall financial crisis. Many global financial institutions 
successively went bankruptcy or nationalized. The whole world then fell into a swirl of 
financial turmoil, and the world economy was heavily shocked. The main economies such as 
America and Europe slipped into recession, emerging-market countries were experiencing a 
cold autumn. In this integrated world, every country and region is closely interrelated to each 
other, be them emerging or developed markets. For China, situation could not be rosy alone, 
especially when China’s export-GDP ratio had been standing at 40% for several years up to 
2008. In the second half of 2008, almost every month witnessed export growth rate declining 
continuously. 
 
Table 5: Main Economic Indicators Prior to the Two Stimulus Plans 
 (% change from previous period) 
 
GDP 
(1) 
Total Retail 
Sales of 
Consumer 
Goods 
(2)  
Total 
Investment 
in Fixed 
Assets 
(3) 
Import 
and 
Export 
(4) 
CPI 
(5) 
Employment 
in Urban 
Area 
(6) 
 
1997 Q1 10.4 16.8 13.9 11.6 4.0 -0.3 
1997 Q1-2 10.2 14.1 13.8 13.1 2.8 -0.1 
1997 Q1-3 9.6 12.5 11.2 13.7 1.8 -0.4 
1997 Q1-4 9.3 10.4 10.8 12.1 0.4 -1.2 
1998 Q1 7.6 7.6 10.3 8.5 0.7 -1.5 
1998 Q1-2 7.2 7.5 13.8 5.2 -1.3 -2.0 
2007 Q1-2 13.4 15.4 26.7 23.3 3.2 2.4 
2007 Q1-3 13.4 15.9 26.4 23.5 4.1 2.3 
2007 Q1-4 13 16.8 25.8 23.5 4.8 2.7 
2008 Q1 10.6 20.6 25.9 24.6 8.0 2.6 
2008 Q1-2 10.4 21.4 26.8 25.7 7.9 2.7 
2008 Q1-3 9.9 22.0 27.6 25.2 7.0 2.7 
Sources: China Statistical Year Book and National Bureau of Statistics of China 
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From Table 5, economic indicators show that in 1998, China’s economy was suffering from a 
more serious slump than in 2008. In 1998, consumption growth dropped dramatically but in 
2008 it was still increasing (Column 2). In 1998, the growth of import and export plunged 
quickly from 11.6% to 5.2%, but in 2008, the trend was much stable (Column 4). For CPI, in 
1998, China’s economy faced a serious deflation, while in 2008, the CPI was still positive 
(Column 5). As for the very important issue of employment, in 1998, the unemployment was 
serious while it was moderate in 2008. The budget revenue had grown to 5.1322 trillion 
(20.6% of GDP) in 2008 from 987.6 billion RMB (11.7% of GDP) in 1998. This gave the 
government more arsenals for fiscal intervention in 2008. The fundamentals in 2008 seemed 
to be better than that in 1998.  
 
B. Both stimulus plans expanded government’s expenditure and resulted in higher deficits in 
absolute and relative terms. 
From the two figures below (figure 8 and 9), we can see during the two expansion periods, 
deficits stood at a much higher level than normal periods, but still remained at a low 
proportion of GDP (less than 3%). This reflects Chinese government’s reservation and 
risk-control when applying deficit as a fiscal tool. Reckless countries that are easily exposed 
to debt crisis should learn this from China. 
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Figure 8: Government Deficits 
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Figure 9: Government Deficit Relative to GDP, % 
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C. The government’s policy response was much quicker in 2008 than in 1998 
Opponents to fiscal stimulus often argue that because of time lag in the recognition of 
recession, delay in administration and the time lag of the policy effect, fiscal policies mess 
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things up rather than fix things up. But in China, the 4-trillion stimulus plan, as many other 
fiscal policies taken before, did not go through the legislation i.e. the People’s Congress to get 
approval. Pundits and politicians decide what is good for the people and immediately put it 
into effect. Therefore, the headache problem of time lag in public policy is eliminated to a 
large extent here in the one-party-ruling China. 
 
As for the 2008 stimulus, it responded even more quickly and systematically to the crisis than 
the 1998 stimulus. Just two months after the Lehman Brothers collapsed the Chinese central 
government announced the 4-trillion stimulus plan. By contrast, the 1998 stimulus came out 
one year after the Asian financial crisis erupted which also lacked a systematic strategy and 
led to a year by year discretion on the fiscal stimulus. As stated in the previous session, for 
the 1998 stimulus the central government made yearly fiscal policy based on previous year’s 
economic performance and outlook on future economic trend rather than a whole 
stimulus-package. Besides, sometimes the government even changed budget plan in the 
middle of year. This reflected that Chinese government was not confident in counter-cyclical 
management in 1998. By contrast, the 2008 stimulus was a complete package for a two-year 
spectrum. It could demonstrate that the Chinese government became more mature and 
confident on the use of fiscal tools. Consequently, the 2008 stimulus package would probably 
eliminate much time-lag. 
 
D. The two stimuli both emphasized on the infrastructure investment but specific measures of 
2008 were more comprehensive than that of 1998 
From Table 6, it is clear that both stimuli took infrastructure investment as the main leverage 
to boost aggregate demand. The difference is that the 2008 stimulus of public spending was 
not only confined to investment, but also included consumption subsidies and tax rebates. In 
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the 4-trillion stimulus plan, the Chinese government gave handsome subsidies (about 10% of 
total price) to durables consumptions like autos and home appliances. This was most 
welcomed by the common people and encouraged private consumptions. In a retrospective 
view, the consumption subsidies and export tax-rebate are estimated to be 600 billion Yuan 
for the year 2009 alone (Cong, 2010). Therefore, the 2008 stimulus went beyond traditional 
Keynesianism to expand government spending only, but also tried to encourage private 
consumption and export.  
 
Table 6 also shows that social welfare and technology innovation were more emphasized in 
the 2008 stimulus. With more supply of public goods like education and health care, the 
government aimed to encourage people’s consumptions on other goods. Meanwhile, with 
more investments on technology innovation, the government expected to enhance long-term 
productivity and optimize the economy’s structure. 
 
Another distinct feature of the 2008 stimulus fiscal policy is its tax-reduction measures while 
in the 1998 stimulus the central government didn’t cut tax much. The main reason is that in 
1998, the tax base in China was narrow and weak. In 1998 tax revenue to GDP ratio was only 
11.6%, much lower than the average level of developing countries, no mention developed 
ones. The fiscal burden on people and enterprises at that time was not tax but various 
administrative fees and fines charged by the local governments. Therefore, from 1998 to 2003, 
the central government took extensive efforts to regulate these unreasonable charges by the 
local governments. By 2008, after years of fast economic development and regulations on tax 
collection, the tax revenue for the central government grew fast, standing at a level of 17% of 
GDP, and this rendered the central government a more flexible space to cut tax. 
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Table 6: Comparison of the Specific Measures of 1998 and 2008 Fiscal Stimuli 
Category 1998  2008 
Infrastructure 
Construction 
(1) 
1. Irrigation systems for agriculture and forestry;  
2. Transportations and telecommunications 
3. Urban infrastructure 
4. Technology improvement and industry upgrading 
5. Electricity grid upgrading in rural area 
6. Infrastructure in education, culture, health and tourism 
7. State grain reserve depots 
8. Environment protection 
9. Infrastructure in law enforcement agencies 
1. Low-income housing construction 
2. Infrastructure in rural area 
3. Railway, highway and airport 
4. Rebuilding projects in the 2008 Sichuan earthquake-hit 
area 
 
Tax Cuts and 
Administrative 
Fee 
Elimination 
(2) 
1. Lower the tariff on a number of commodities, lower the 
consumption tax on a number of commodities, lower 
taxes on banks, insurance companies and securities 
exchange 
2. Cut the regulation tax on fixed assets investment 
3. Increase export rebate rate 
4. Favorable tax policy for some strategic projects like 
“development of the west region” and “revitalization of 
northeast China”  
5. Eliminate 1913 items of fee-charging and lower 479 
items of fee-charging.  
1. Overall reform on value added tax 
2. Lift the tax threshold for individual income 
3. Temporary exemption for saving deposit interest 
4. Cut tax on securities exchange 
5. Cut tax on residential housing transaction 
6. Cut taxes related to real estate transaction 
7. Lower or eliminate administrative fees   
8. Raise the export rebate rate, lower and eliminate tariff on a 
number of items 
9. Favorable tax on vehicle purchasing 
10.  Elimination of agriculture taxation 
Income 
Redistribution 
(3) 
1. Increase the salary of government employees, increase 
spending on retired people  
2. Improve the quality of social security, and increase 
pensions for those working for private sector 
3. Increase tax on the interest gain of saving deposit 
 
1. Increase subsidies to peasants, increase the 
state-purchasing price for grains 
2. Increase pension for the people retired from companies, 
create personal pension account for retirees 
3. Uplift the level of minimum wage 
4. Push business equities to buy  insurances of pension, 
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unemployment and accident for the employees 
5. Tighten control on the income of state-owned 
entrepreneurs, especially those enjoying natural monopoly. 
Transfer 
Payment 
(4) 
1. Give more favor to the central and western regions of 
China which were less developed 
2. Give money to the local governments which carried out 
environment protection and agriculture taxation reform 
1. Enhance the transfer payment to central and western 
regions 
 
Social Welfare 
Enhancement 
(5) 
1. Establish a medical, educational and unemployment social 
security mechanism  
2. Raise pension level for retirees  
1. Reform on the taxation related to agriculture, emphasize on 
relieving burdens from peasants 
2. Guarantee the budget for young generation’s 9-year free 
and compulsory education. 
3. Increase education loans and state financial support for 
students from poor families  
4. Carry out an overall medical aid plan in rural area, expand 
the medical insurance coverage on urban residence; 
provide basic medi-aid to the people retired from 
bankrupted companies 
5. Improve the medical service for the grassroots 
6. Establish an official basic medicine list 
7. Try to ensure a minimum welfare for the people 
8. Improve the unemployment insurance mechanism 
Enhance the control on food’s safety and drugs’ safety 
Technology 
Innovation, 
Energy 
Efficiency, 
Emission 
Reduction and 
Environment 
1. Support R&D and technology upgrading in some key 
industries 
 
2. Support the main projects on science and technology 
3. Support the fundamental and commonweal R&D 
4. Favorable tax policy for entrepreneurs’ R&D 
5. Promote the development of  hi-tech industries and 
equipment-manufacturing industry 
6. Support a number of big projects on energy-efficiency and 
emission reduction 
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Protection 
(6) 
7. Push the reform on fuel pricing and improve the resource 
tax system 
8. Establish and improve the charging mechanism on the use 
of mineral resources and compensation on environmental 
damage 
9. Further promote reforestation on farming land 
10. Further improve the state fund for compensation on forest 
ecology improvement 
11. Favorable tax policy for small and medium entrepreneurs      
  Sources: National Development and Reform Commission; Ministry of Finance, China     
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E. Financial markets were more developed in 2008 than ten years before and brought 
in both opportunity and challenges for the fiscal stimulus. 
In 1998, the market value of “A share” stocks in China was 588.3 billion Yuan, about 
7% of that year’s GDP. In 2008, its market value grew to 14.72 trillion Yuan, about 
49% of GDP. The development of financial market could be a two-sided sword for the 
stimulus plan. On one hand the sophisticated market could match the demand and 
supply of funds more efficiently and reduce transaction cost, but on the other hand, 
the massive financial market itself might tie up a huge amount of money, leaves 
money circulate in the financial system, blowing up asset bubbles while delaying fund 
supply to production activities (Qiu Ying, 2009). Besides, the so-called “wealth 
effect” does not appear to affect Chinese people much. The extremely high and 
consistently rising saving rate could stand as evidence. Therefore, the government 
might be cautious when injecting money into the economic system and guide it to 
where it is truly deserved. 
 
In fact, immediately after the 2008 stimulus plan kicked off, Chinese financial 
regulators made systematic regulations regarding the use of government funds and 
related bank credits, limiting their flow into asset market. It seems the Chinese 
regulators reached a consensus that money’s circulation in asset market does more bad 
than good for the economy’s recovery.  
 
3. Lessons  
 
Fiscal stimulus spending on infrastructure could increase long-term growth potential 
for a developing country like China. In the 7 years from 1998 to 2004, the Chinese 
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government issued 910 billion Yuan long-term construction bonds specifically to fund 
infrastructure, with a focus on releasing bottlenecks to growth (Lin, 2009). The huge 
amount issues of long-term bonds were used to promote constructions of 
infrastructure, upgrade technologies for state-owned enterprises and optimize the 
structure of industries. In the following period of the stimulus (2002-2008), average 
annual GDP growth reached 10.8%, 1.2 percentage points higher than the average 
annual growth rate of 9.6% from 1979 to 2002. The corresponding increase in 
government budget revenues allowed government debts to decline from more than 
16% of GDP at the beginning of 2003 to 12 % in 2008.  
 
The Chinese experience of fiscal stimulus suggested that for a developing country if 
public spending is invested in projects that release the bottleneck of growth, the 
investment would generate high returns to pay for their costs and debts. Therefore, 
budget deficit might be unavoidable when the government carries out fiscal stimulus. 
As long as the deficit is limited within a certain proportion of GDP, it seems not 
necessary to worry about it too much. It was from the 1998 situation-forced 
experience, the Chinese government realized that deficits and debts were not 
definitely bad things. This realization overthrew the government’s decades-long 
concept of “bearing neither domestic nor foreign debts”. Chinese policy makers’ 
mindset regarding fiscal stimulus and fiscal deficit had changed since the 1998 
stimulus and thus they reacted much quicker in the 2008 crisis. 
 
Furthermore, the Chinese government’s investment seems not to have “crowding out” 
effect but have a “crowding in” effect. This is partly demonstrated in Table 7. Private 
sectors’ investment remained a stable proportion while the government threw out 
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huge amount of money. This means the private sectors also were increasing spending 
as the government was. This might be explained by reasons that 1) government 
investments were focused on public areas which originally do not attract private 
investment, 2) the interest rates in China were not totally decided by the market and 3) 
the savings by residents and enterprises were very high (more than 40%), i.e., there 
were large excess of deposits over loans on banks’ balance sheets and fund supply 
was abundant. 4) Another important reason could be that government’s actions would 
bolster confidence and revive people’s animal spirits, then private investments just 
“herd” with the government investment and are “crowed in” (Akerlof & Shiller, 2009). 
It was estimated by some Chinese economists that government’s stimuli drove 2-3 
times more non-government funds into investments. 
 
Table 7: Sources of Fixed Asset Investment, 1998-2004 
Year 
Breakdown of Sources for Fixed Asset Investment (%) 
State Budget 
Domestic 
Loans 
Foreign 
Investment 
Self-raising Funds 
and Others 
1998 4.2 19.3 9.1 67.4 
1999 6.2 19.2 6.7 67.8 
2000 6.4 20.3 5.1 68.2 
2001 6.7 19.1 4.6 69.6 
2002 7.0 19.7 4.6 68.7 
2003 4.6 20.5 4.4 70.5 
2004 4.4 18.5 4.4 72.7 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, China 
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IV. SOME ANALYTIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE STIMULUS PLAN  
 
1. Application of IS-LM model 
 
According to the Keynesian macroeconomic theory, aggregate demand is the key to 
the short-term fluctuations in national income. Here I apply IS-LM model to analyze 
China’s stimulus plans. The IS-LM model is roughly stated in the following two 
equations: 
 
Y=c(Y-T) +I(r) +G 
M/P=L(r, Y) 
 
Where Y is GDP, c is Marginal Consumption Propensity, T is tax, I is Investment, r is 
interest rate, G is Government Spending, M is Money Supply, P is Price, L is 
Liquidity Demand. 
 
The first equation represents equilibrium in goods and services market, and the 
second equation represents equilibrium in money market. This model is to examine 
the relationship between variables in short term. Therefore, P is assumed to be fixed, 
M, G and T are exogenous, c is also assumed to be stable in a short time. Then r and Y 
adjust to maintain the IS-LM equilibrium, as illustrated in Figure 10. Government’s 
fiscal policy is incorporated in the IS curve while monetary policy in the LM curve.  
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Figure 10 
 
The IS curve equation could be further decomposed into the following sub-functions: 
 
C=a+cY   (Consumption Function) 
S=Y–C    (Saving Function) 
I=e–dr    (Investment Function) 
G=T+b  (Government Spending Function) 
Y=C+I+G  (GDP Identity for a Closed Economy) 
 
Where C is aggregate consumption, a is compulsory consumption and c is Marginal 
Consumption Propensity, Y is income, S is saving, I is investment, e is max 
investment, r is interest rate and d is the coefficient of interest rate’s effect on 
investment. T is tax and b is deficit. Combine and reorganize the above equations, we 
get the IS curve: 
 
r=(a+e+G)/d–(1-c)/d ·Y     
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The slope of this IS curve is –(1-c)/d. Other things being equal, the smaller of c and d, 
the bigger of (1-c)/d and the steeper of the IS curve. For China, its c (CPM) seems to 
be relatively small compared with other countries. There could be a handful of 
reasons for this: a tradition of thrift, low social welfare protection, saving for 
children’s education and a widening gap between rich and poor, just to name a few. As 
for d, the coefficient of interest rate’s effect on investment, it is assumed not 
significantly different from zero. This is because China’s interest rate is not formed 
through market mechanism but thoroughly by the central government’s order and 
therefore the correlation between interest rate and investment in China is not strong 
(Mao, 2009). Consequently, the IS curve’s slope is steep. 
 
The LM curve equation could be further decomposed into the following sub 
functions: 
 
M/P=L(Y) +L(r) 
L(Y) = k·Y  (money demand from transactions in real economy) 
L(r) =-h·r  (money demand from speculations and investments) 
 
Where M is money supply, P is price level, L is liquidity demand, k is the coefficient 
of output’s effect on liquidity demand, -h is the coefficient of interest rate’s effect on 
liquidity demand. When applied in practice, the economic variables on both sides of 
the equations are taken log form. Therefore, k and h measure the elasticity or 
sensitivity of money demand to output(Y) and interest rate (r). Combine and 
reorganize the above equations, we get the LM curve: 
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r=(k/h)·Y-M/(P·h)             
 
For the LM curve, its slope is k/h. It is obvious that the bigger of h and smaller of k, 
the flatter of the LM slope. To see if LM’s slope is flat or steep is just to compare k 
and h and see which one is bigger. And this is boiled down to the question of “money 
demand is more sensitive to GDP or to interest rate”. 
 
In China, as its financial market is developing at an ever-fast speed in the recent 
decade and people have more choices to invest (or say speculate with) their money, 
money demand becomes more and more sensitive to the interest rate than it is to GDP. 
It seems to be a paradox: as mentioned before, the interest rate is mainly decided by 
the government, and investment is not strongly correlated to interest rate, then why 
money demand is more sensitive to interest rate than it is to GDP? Money flows to 
higher return, be it real investment or virtual speculation. As the government lowers 
interest rate (especially when the real interest rate turns negative), individuals may 
withdraw a chunk of their money and put it into asset market; institutional investors 
would also suddenly demand a lot of money for speculation. By contrast, as GDP 
grows, additional transactions may ask only for a matching amount of money. 
Therefore, money demand may be more sensitive to interest rate than GDP.  
 
This is only a simplified qualitative explanation of why h is bigger than k, and real 
situation may be more complex and subject to change with different environments. 
Some empirical studies have also shown that China’ IS curve is relatively steep and 
LM curve flat (Yang, 2006; Wen, 2010), as the shape showed in Figure 10.  
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When the steep IS curve shifted to the right, it would increase output more than a flat 
IS curve. 
Figure 11 
 
In addition, during both of the fiscal stimulus plans, the Chinese government adopted 
a loose monetary policy: lowering both required reserve ratio and interest rate.  
 
Figure 12: Chinese Banks’ Required Reserve Ratio, 1987-2011 
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Source: People’s Bank of China 
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Figure 13: Deposit Interest Rate Set by the People’s Bank of China, 1996-2011 
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Therefore, the LM curve was also shifted toward right. The fiscal boosting could be 
more effective than coming alone. As illustrated in Figure 14, the new equilibrium 
moves from point A to B.  
 
Figure 14 
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When applying the GDP identity, GDP=C+I+G+NX, to analyze the Chinese 
government’s stimulus plan, we can find that in 2008 the government’s fiscal boosting 
intentions are not just focused on “G” (government spending), but also on “C” 
(private consumption) and NX (net export) through tax reduction and subsidies to 
consumer durables as illustrated before in table 6. Furthermore, if the government 
investment as a down payment could trigger private investment to follow up, then 
even “I” (private investment) could also rise. Therefore, Chinese government’s 2008 
fiscal stimulus appears to be a comprehensive therapy to boost each components of 
the demand side of the GDP identity and shift IS curve much further to the right. 
 
At the mean time, we should be aware that in a crisis or recession, when workers and 
factory lie idle, the IS curve is pulled leftward, thus reduces aggregate demand; a 
fiscal boost is just to push the IS curve rightward back to its potential position, not to 
overstretch it. 
 
2. Expectation management 
Besides the real money in the stimulus plan, psychological factor also appeared to 
influence economic growth. In the Chinese government’ 4-trillion Yuan stimulus 
package, a larger part is soft number, i.e. the money expected to be invested by other 
agents rather than the central government’s expenditure. As Gao Peiyong (2010) put it: 
“The 4-trillion investment plan is nothing more than an estimation of the total 
investment amount that could be triggered by the initial 1.18 trillion public spending”. 
 
Why the Chinese government counts the chicken before they are hatched? What 
causes the Chinese government to adopt this “expectation-management” strategy? Do 
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people’s expectations matter for China’s economy? How much is the influence on the 
output? Here I build a simple regression model to check the relation: 
 
Yt=a+bCt-1+e 
 
Where Yt is the GDP growth rate in quarter t 
Ct-1 is the Consumer Confidence Index (CCI) in quarter t-1 
“a” and “b” are parameter to be estimated, “e” is residual 
 
There are several notices to the model building: 
1) Why use only one independent variable to examine the volatility of GDP growth? 
Since this model is to check psychological impact on GDP growth, on the right side of 
the model, I just used one confidence index to represent people’s psychological status. 
Real economic factors like consumption and investment are not incorporated as 
independent variables because this model is to check the impact of economic agents’ 
outlook on real economic output. And it is also assumed that at a certain point in time 
there would only be one aggregate outlook. I use the CCI as a proxy of this aggregate 
outlook. 
 
2) Why use CCI as the psychological variable, not other index measuring people’s 
outlook for the future? 
The Chinese government has been collecting and publishing monthly CCI since 1998 
and the data is more complete than other index measuring people’s perspective like 
Investors’ Confidence Index. Moreover, all investors are at the same time consumers, 
therefore I assume CCI would represent people’s general outlook on future economic 
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situation. 
 
3) Why use a time-lag of one-quarter period? 
The measuring mechanism of China’s CCI reveals that the index is to reflect people’s 
confidence in the near future. I assume this “near future” is the next 3 months.  
 
I collected the quarterly data of CCI and GDP growth from the third quarter of 2003 
to the third quarter of 2008 (just prior to the Chinese government’s 4-trillion stimulus), 
and then regress GDP growth (Yt) on the previous quarter’s CCI (Ct-1). 
 
Table 10: Results from Regressing Yt on Ct-1 
 Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic p-value 
Intercept -35.0936 12.9563 -2.709 .0144 
Ct-1 0.4174 0.1173 3.558 .0022 
Residual standard error 1.087    
R-squared 0.413    
Observations 20    
 
From the above regression output, it seems that CCI at the end of one quarter has 
statistically significant explanatory power for the next quarter’s GDP growth rate. And 
generally speaking, one unit of CCI change in the current quarter is associated with 
0.417 percentage point change of GDP growth rate in the next quarter. Therefore, the 
model could be written as: 
 
Yt= -35.09+0.417Ct-1+e 
Where Yt is the GDP growth rate in quarter t 
Ct-1 is the Consumer Confidence Index (CCI) in quarter t-1 
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The model sheds some light on the relationship between CCI and GDP growth. My 
conjecture is that this relationship probably had been observed by the Chinese policy 
makers and applied in the “4-trillion” stimulus trick. The famous saying of Chinese 
Prime Minister Wen Jiabao may give a hint to the trick: “When in economic crisis, 
confidence is much more important than gold and money.” This is similar to the 
famous remark by former US President Franklin Roosevelt: “The only thing we have 
to fear is fear itself”. So people’s confidence really matters when in crisis. The 
government’s first priority should probably be to remain confidence, and then 
maintain growth. 
 
Therefore, it is not a surprise that when the Chinese central government announced 
the 4-trillion stimulus plan, no concrete information was released. And the Chinese 
media, tightly controlled and censored by the government, all applauded and 
appraised the stimulus plan without any in-depth report as their professionalism 
required. In public opinion, there were no skeptics about the validity or soundness of 
the stimulus plan. A uniform, optimistic public opinion on the stimulus plan 
strengthened people’s confidence in government’s determination and the economy as 
a whole, which in turn would probably strengthen the effect of the stimulus itself.  
 
Facts proved some effectiveness of this trick. Following the central government’s 
announcement (not implementation yet) of the stimulus plan, local governments and 
state-owned companies, being swelled by confidence, began pouring money on major 
investments that they would otherwise have skipped. Commercial banks also freed 
their tied hands and threw money out. Other economic institutions and individuals 
were doing similar things: just spend money. Figure 15 shows that GDP growth 
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significantly coordinates with CCI movement before and after the November 2008 
stimulus initiation.  
 
Figure 15: China’s Quarterly GDP Growth Rate and CCI, 2003-2010 
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Source: National Bureau of Statistics, China 
 
3. Preliminary effects of the 2008 stimulus 
 
From the previous section, we know that besides infrastructure investments the 2008 
stimulus puts much more emphasis on social welfare than the 1998 stimulus. By 
raising social welfare standards, such as paying the medical bills for the people, the 
government tries to raise people’s consuming capacity and consumption propensity. 
The Chinese government seems more and more convinced that for a big country like 
China, its domestic consumption is the sustainable and reliable driving force for 
economic growth which is not much exposed to outside volatility. Also, to cultivate a 
vigorous domestic consumption would help relieve the problem of global imbalance 
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and reduce foreign pressures on China’s trade policy. 
 
Into the second half of 2010, the overall GDP growth went on a stable recovery and 
the growth structure was rebalancing: consumption was gaining more momentum, 
while export was decreasing and investment stabilizing (Table 8). And during the year 
of 2009, the current account surplus declined to just above 6% of GDP, a fall of over 3 
percentage points. Internal demand seemed to be taking on larger weight. 
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Table 8: Main Economic Indicators since the 2008 Stimulus Plan 
Year Month 
GDP 
(cumulative 
year-on-year 
% change) 
 
Total Retail 
Sales of 
Consumer Goods 
(% change from 
same month of 
last year)  
Total Investment 
in Fixed Assets 
(cumulative 
year-on-year % 
change) 
Export 
(% change from 
same month of 
last year) 
2008 
9 
9 
23.2 27.6 21.5 
10 22 27.2 19.2 
11 20.8 26.8 -2.2 
12 19 26.1 -2.8 
2009 
1 
6.1 
18.5  -17.5 
2 11.6 26.5 -25.7 
3 14.7 28.6 -17.1 
4 
7.1 
14.8 30.5 -22.6 
5 15.2 32.9 -26.4 
6 15 33.6 -21.4 
7 
8.1 
15.2 32.9 -23.0 
8 15.4 33.0 -23.4 
9 15.5 33.3 -15.2 
 
10 
9.1 
16.2 33.1 -13.8 
11 15.8 32.1 -1.2 
12 17.5 30.5 17.7 
2010 
1 
11.9 
  21 
2 22.1 26.6 45.7 
3 18 26.4 24.3 
4 
11 
18.5 26.1 30.5 
5 18.6 25.9 48.5 
6 18.3 25.5 43.9 
7  17.9 24.9 38.1 
8  18.4 24.8 34.4 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, China 
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper examines the Chinese government’s 4-trillion stimulus plan regarding its 
trigger, source and use, compares it with the 1998 stimulus regarding economic 
backgrounds, deficit expansion, policy responding time, specific measures and 
financial market’s maturity, and then analyzes the fiscal stimulus with IS-LM model 
and checks the relation between expectation and growth with a simple regression 
model. 
 
It is found that the Chinese government’s fiscal stimulus policy follows the logics of 
Keynesian economics and the IS-LM model could explain the policy to a large extent. 
Moreover, since the IS curve seems steep and LM curve flat in China, the government 
focuses on fiscal stimulus while applies loose monetary policy as a support. Debts and 
deficits are main features of the fiscal expansion. Infrastructure is the main area to 
spend the stimulus money. 
 
It is also discovered that the 4-trillion stimulus plan comprises of both hard number 
and soft number. The hard number of 1.18 trillion Yuan is an incremental government 
expenditure, which might have Keynesian multiplier for a developing country 
encountering recession. The soft number of 2.82 trillion Yuan, though just an 
estimation of the “crowding in” effect of the initial 1.18 trillion Yuan public spending, 
could also be seen as a trick of expectation management. 
 
So far, the 2008 stimulus has been in place for about 2 years and its positive effects on 
economic performance are gradually releasing. The macroeconomic indicators 
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following the stimulus somewhat demonstrate the vitality of Keynesian economics in 
anti-recession operation. 
 
Meanwhile, the Chinese government’s trick in the 2008 stimulus plan indicates that 
public policy should pay attention to its signaling effect on people’s expectation, 
especially for the economic policies aiming to influence people’s activities. Being 
aware that expectation may affect demand, the government could arrange propaganda 
campaign for its stimulus policy and lead people to form an optimistic outlook on the 
consequences of the policy, such as “a fiscal stimulus would result in an economic 
recovery”. The Chinese government has a strong hand on media, so policy 
propaganda would not a problem. Once a certain expectation is getting weight and 
breaking a critical point, all the other expectations would converge into this 
expectation（Zhao Jingmei，2008）. Since the announcement of the 4-trillion stimulus 
plan, no opposite opinions or skepticism could be found in the Chinese media. 
Government’s absolute influence on domestic media helps form a uniform, positive 
expectation on the future economy. And this expectation, together with some initial 
effects of public spending, in turn would drive up people’s economic activities and 
help further boost demand and growth. 
 
For all the analysis, two main pointers stand out. First, when in recession, 
Keynesianism seems still effective for a developing country whose infrastructure is 
far from complete. Second, agents’ expectation appears to forerun economic growth, 
and if handled properly, it could probably help enhance government’s stimulus, 
although this entails more delicacy in propaganda and public sentiment management. 
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